Santa Clara High Technology Law Journal
Volume 32 | Issue 1

Article 1

12-9-2015

Only a Pawn in the Game: Rethinking Induced
Patent Infringement
W. Keith Robinson

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj
Part of the Intellectual Property Law Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons
Recommended Citation
W. Keith Robinson, Only a Pawn in the Game: Rethinking Induced Patent Infringement, 32 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 1 (2015).
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/chtlj/vol32/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Santa
Clara High Technology Law Journal by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.

ONLY A PAWN IN THE GAME: RETHINKING
INDUCED PATENT INFRINGEMENT
W. Keith Robinson†
A party that causes another to infringe a patent may be liable for
induced infringement. Recently, the Supreme Court and the Federal
Circuit have interpreted the inducement statute in a way that may be
problematic. For example, in a suit for induced patent infringement a
plaintiff must show that an accused party had specific intent to cause
infringement. The defendant can rebut allegations of induced
infringement by showing that he had a good faith belief that he did
not infringe the patent. However, a defendant’s good faith belief that
the patent is invalid is no longer a defense to inducement. While the
accused party’s actions or conduct could also be relevant, these
scienter-based inquiries indicate that the law’s current interpretation
of inducement focuses primarily on intent.
In response, this article suggests that the current trend in
induced infringement analysis places too much emphasis on the
question of intent. Further, this article argues that the conduct of an
accused party should remain an important influence in the induced
infringement determination. Numerous papers have suggested how
courts should determine the level of intent required for induced
infringement. In contrast, this article asserts that many of the
challenges in this area can be addressed by understanding the type of
inducing conduct that patent law should discourage.
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INTRODUCTION
The next five years will usher in a paradigm shift in the Internet
Age. At the beginning of this decade, the number of “connected”
devices on earth outnumbered the world’s population.1 With this new
connected world will come new collaborative applications and
technology that will enhance commercial industries, services and the

1.
See Oladayo Bello & Sherali Zeadally, Intelligent Device-to-Device Communication
in the Internet of Things, IEEE SYSTEMS JOURNAL 1, 1 (2014) (stating that “By 2010, the
number of devices connected to the Internet rose to 12.5 billion while the world’s population
increased to 6.8 billion”).
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human experience.2 This new “data age” will provide tremendous
opportunities for innovators to change the way people go about their
daily lives by integrating technology in new and innovative ways.3
Undoubtedly, some innovators will seek to use the patent system
to protect their ideas. One key question is whether it will be
worthwhile to obtain patents on these new interactive technologies.4
Several theories attempt to justify patents and explain the existence of
the current U.S. patent system. For example, reward theory explains
that patents are rewards to the inventor for creating her invention.5
Prospect theory asserts that the government grants patents to
inventors so that the inventor is free to commercialize subject matter
embodied in the patent disclosure.6 Regardless of the theory,
inventors of connected device technology will most likely seek
patents because they believe that they will acquire rights that are
beneficial and enforceable.7
Patentees commercialize technologically beneficial patents or
license them to entities that are better suited to commercialize the
invention.8 Patentees may also have an expectation that they can

2.
See Nick Bilton, Can the Apple Watch Woo Traditional Watch Fans?, N. Y. TIMES
(Sept. 12, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/12/fashion/can-the-apple-watchwoo-traditional-watch-fans.html? (last visited Feb. 12, 2015) (reporting that 43 million wearable
bands will be sold in 2015).
3.
See Steve Lohr, M.B.A. Programs Start to Follow Silicon Valley into the Data Age,
N. Y. TIMES (DEC. 26, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/26/business/mbaprograms-start-to-follow-silicon-valley-into-the-data-age.html (explaining that M.B.A. business
plan competitions often involve the use of sensor data).
4.
Several legal doctrines present challenges for patentees of interactive claims.
Specifically, these doctrines make it difficult for interactive patentees to successfully enforce
their patents against infringers. See generally Mark Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225 (2005) (discussing induced infringement and how courts decide
induced infringement cases); Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97
MINN. L. REV. 72, 117 (2012) (arguing that the modern patent infringement analysis is
becoming more unmanageable and complex); Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of
Induced Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 399 (2006) (discussing
the intent element for induced infringement); Ted Sichelman, Patent Law Revisionism at the
Supreme Court, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 307 (2013-2014) (discussing the intent required for
inducing infringement); see also W. Keith Robinson, No “Direction” Home: An Alternative
Approach to Joint Infringement, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 59, 109-18 (2012) (discussing the impact of
divided infringement on interactive patents).
5.
See Fritz Machlup, Study Of The Subcommittee On Patents, Trademarks, And
Copyrights Of The Senate Judiciary Committee, 85th Cong., 2d Sess., An Economic Review Of
The Patent System, Study No. 15 (Comm. Print 1958).
6.
See Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. &
ECON. 265, 266 (1977).
7.
See Machlup, supra note 5, at 21.
8.
See id. at 6, 74.
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enforce the rights granted to them by the U.S. government.9
Specifically, patentees have the right to exclude others from making
or using their invention.10 The law considers any performance of these
actions without authorization infringement of the patent.11
There are two main types of infringement. Direct infringement of
a patent occurs when an entity makes, uses or performs each and
every element of a patent claim.12 The second type of infringement is
indirect infringement. Indirect infringement occurs when more than
one party is involved in the infringement of a patent claim.13
There are two variations of indirect infringement—contributory
and induced. Contributory infringement generally covers situations
where one party provides another with a part or component which
when combined with other components infringes an apparatus
claim.14 Induced infringement occurs when one party encourages or
aids another to infringe a patent.15
This article focuses on induced infringement because of its
relevance to patentees of interactive and connected inventions.
Patentees of these emerging technologies commonly bring a cause of
action under inducement instead of relying on direct infringement16
by asserting that the patent was directly infringed and that the accused
party aided or abetted in the infringement.17 Specifically, a patentee

9.
Id. at 1.
10.
35 U.S.C. § 271 (2010).
11.
Id.
12.
See id. at § 271(a) (“Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever without
authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or
imports into the United States any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor,
infringes the patent”).
13.
See Cabrice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931) (stating
that direct and indirect infringement are essentially torts).
14.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2010) (“Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United
States or imports into the United States a component of a patented machine, manufacture,
combination or composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process,
constituting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or
commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a
contributory infringer”).
15.
Id.
16.
See 5-17 Donald S. Chisum, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 17.04 [4][f] (Matthew Bender)
(“A patent owner’s ability to prevent active inducement by advertising and instruction or other
activity is often critical to obtaining effective protection for a patented invention consisting of a
new method of use of a known, staple product, such as a chemical compound or composition,
especially a new medical or therapeutic use of a product that has an established alternative
medical use”).
17.
See Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir.
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must show that the accused inducer performed some offensive
conduct with the requisite intent.18
The law of induced patent infringement is as important as it is
confusing. Legal interpretations of inducement have continued to
change since the statute was enacted in 1952.19 Even the Supreme
Court has acknowledged that the inducement statute is ambiguous.20
Ambiguity in this area is undesirable because the technology areas in
which induced infringement is more likely to occur are important to
the U.S. economy. For example, patentees in these technology areas
commonly operate businesses in financial services, personalized
medicine and the Internet of Things.21
Unfortunately, recent case law in this area has added complexity
and created uncertainty as to whether patentees can effectively
enforce their rights in inventions that are susceptible to induced
infringement.22 The main debate centers around knowledge and
intent. The Supreme Court recently opined upon this issue in Commil
USA LLC v. Cisco Sys. Inc. First, the Supreme Court clarified that
liability for induced infringement requires proof that the defendant
knew her induced acts infringed the asserted patent.23 Second, the
Court clarified the types of defenses that are available to an accused
inducer.24 Specifically, the Court held that the defendant’s good faith

2012).
18.
See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065, 179 L. Ed. 2d
1167 (2011) (interpreting 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) to require intent and some affirmative act); see
Lemley, supra note 4, at 226 (explaining that the two fundamental issues with respect to induced
infringement are conduct and intent).
19.
In the last two decades the interpretation of induced infringement has evolved. See
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (opining that “that
proof of actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the infringement is a necessary
prerequisite to finding active inducement”); but see Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys.,
Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (stating that a plaintiff must show that a defendant
possessed specific intent); DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2006)
(approving of the approach taken by the Federal Circuit panel in Manville Sales); see also
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1928 (2015) (holding that a defendant’s
good faith belief that an asserted patent is invalid is not a defense to inducement).
20.
See id.
21.
See infra Part I.
22.
See Hewlett-Packard, supra note 19; Manville, supra note 19; DSU, supra note 19 at
1306 (approving the approach in Manville Sales).
23.
Commil, supra note 19. Commil (and the Government as amicus curiae) argued the
accused inducer need only intend to cause the acts that led to infringement to satisfy the intent
requirement. See also Hewlett-Packard, supra note 19. The opposing argument—seemingly
accepted by the majority—is that the accused inducer must have specifically intended to cause
the actual infringement of the patent. See Manville, supra note 19; DSU, supra note 19.
24.
See Commil, supra note 19.
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belief that the asserted patent is invalid is not a defense to induced
infringement.25
One effect of the recent interpretations of induced infringement
is that it makes patents asserted under an induced infringement theory
difficult to enforce.26 Further, given the Supreme Court’s recent
activity in the patent area and its aversion to rigid Federal Circuit
tests, a discussion about the current state of inducement law is very
much worth having.27 In sum, it is time to think differently about
induced infringement.
This article suggests that the current trend in induced
infringement analysis places too much emphasis on the question of
intent. Further, this article argues that the conduct of an accused party
should remain an important influence in the induced infringement
determination. The need to recalibrate induced infringement analysis
is framed by three practical considerations: (1) the interactive nature
of emerging technology, (2) the need for clear legal tests and jury
instructions in patent infringement cases and (3) the increasing
expectations that market participants should be able to forecast
whether they infringe a patent. In view of these considerations, this
article proposes that the law rebalance the induced infringement
inquiry by closely considering the conduct of the accused party and
the relationship between the accused inducer and the direct infringer
as a factor in determining infringement liability.
Several scholars have opined on the problems surrounding
induced patent infringement,28 but few have explored the influence of
inducing conduct on induced infringement analysis in view of the
connected device age and the new challenges patentees face
concerning enforcement. Accordingly, this article contributes to the
literature in three ways. First, it sets out a framework for thinking
about the practical effects of induced infringement jurisprudence.
Second, this article argues that the law should reestablish the conduct
of the accused party as a significant part of any inducement
determination. Third, this article suggests that the law should consider
25.
Id.
26.
See Sichelman, supra note 4, at 343 (arguing that defendants can immunize
themselves against indirect infringement by obtaining opinions of counsel).
27.
See generally KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007), Bilski v. Kappos,
561 U.S. 593 (2010); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 188
(2014).
28.
See Lemley, supra note 4, at 225; Holbrook, supra note 4, at 399; Sichelman, supra
note 4; Jason Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. REV.
1575 (2011).
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other ways to balance the inducement analysis including
characterizing the relationship between the accused inducer and direct
infringer.
Historically, induced infringement analysis appeared to be a
much more balanced inquiry. Before its codification in 1952,
inducement was referred to generally as indirect infringement.29 The
concept of indirect infringement existed to allow for a cause of action
when more than one party was involved in the infringement of a
patent.30 In 1952, Congress codified the common law cause of action
by incorporating it into the statute as contributory infringement and
induced infringement.31 While the contours of contributory
infringement were narrowly defined, one commentator has argued
that induced infringement was seen by some as a catchall and
therefore more broadly written.32 Unfortunately, this generality has
led to confusion and uncertainty about how courts should interpret the
statute.33
The induced infringement statute states, “whoever actively
induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”34
Since its codification, the main issue with respect to induced
infringement has centered on its intent requirement. One
interpretation is that inducement requires the accused party to intend
to cause the acts that led to infringement of the patent.35 This view is
seen as a less difficult standard to meet from the perspective of the
plaintiff. The alternative view is that for there to be liability for
induced infringement the accused party must have intended that the
patent be infringed.36 This standard is the prevailing view of the
Federal Circuit, was upheld by the Supreme Court and is perceived as
a higher threshold for plaintiffs to meet.37 This doctrinal split has led
to healthy and vigorous discussions among scholars concerning
29.
Kathrik Kumar, Of Deep-Fryers and (Semiconductor) Chips Why Ignorance of A
Patent is No Excuse, 40 AIPLA Q.J. 727, 738 (2012).
30.
See id. at 729.
31.
See generally The Patent Act of 1952, 35 U.S.C. 271(b) & (c).
32.
See Rantanen, supra note 28, at 1596.
33.
See id. at 1620-22.
34.
35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2010).
35.
See Hewlett-Packard, supra note 19.
36.
DSU, supra note 19 (approving of the Manville Sales approach that an alleged
inducer must be shown to have knowingly induced infringement and not merely the acts that
caused infringement).
37.
See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 405 (comparing the specific intent standard to the
intent to cause acts standard); see also Commil, supra note 19 (all of the Justices agreed that
inducement liability requires that the defendant know her acts were infringing).

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

8

[Vol. 32

induced infringement.38
The scholarly discussion of inducement theory also includes
commentary on how courts decide inducement cases. For example,
inducement decisions have been explained on a sliding scale39 —the
more egregious the conduct of the accused party, the less intent the
courts require to find liability for induced infringement.40 A visual
representation of Mark Lemley’s sliding scale framework is depicted
below (see Figure 1). Let the y-axis be the specificity of intent and the
x-axis be the representation of the defendant’s conduct.

Figure 1
Despite the attempt to explain the influence of conduct in the
inducement inquiry, much of the scholarly discussion regarding
inducement has centered squarely on intent. Recently it was argued
that the Supreme Court repeatedly subverts Congress’ standard for
indirect patent infringement.41 Additionally, the “intent to cause
infringement” standard was viewed as preferable over a broader rule
because a broader rule would be anticompetitive and riskier in that it
could subject innocent actors to liability.42
38.
See Rantanen, supra note 28, at 1579.
39.
See Lemley, supra note 4, at 242 (arguing that forbidden acts and the level of intent
should interact).
40.
Id.
41.
See Sichelman, supra note 4, at 307 (arguing that in Global-Tech, the Supreme Court
subverted Congress’s codification of the scienter requirements for induced infringement).
42.
See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 400 (arguing that anti-competitiveness concerns
support a more narrow standard for intent).
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The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit and the
Supreme Court have revisited the topic of inducement several times.
However, clarity in the induced infringement analysis may have
become harder, not easier, to achieve. In Global-Tech Appliances,
Inc. v. SEB S.A.,, the Supreme Court held that induced infringement
required knowledge that the induced acts constituted patent
infringement.43 The Supreme Court also expanded the meaning of
intent to include willful blindness.44 Thus, a defendant could no
longer deliberately shield themselves from facts that gave rise to
knowledge of the patent at issue.45
Recently in Commil, by a 6-2 vote, the Supreme Court
overturned the Federal Circuit’s previous holding that an accused
inducer’s good faith belief that the asserted patent was invalid could
rebut an allegation of induced infringement.46 This is significant
because the Federal Circuit had already held in an earlier case that a
good faith belief of non-infringement could also be a defense to
induced infringement.47 At the same time, the Court clarified that
liability for inducement requires that the defendant specifically intend
to cause infringing acts.48 While the Supreme Court’s resolution of
the case provides some insight, Justice Scalia’s dissent implied the
Court’s holding would negatively impact patent litigation—
specifically, that it would empower the conduct of “patent trolls.”49
Accordingly, given Congress’ recent willingness to act on patent
reform, several open issues remain. First, should the law of
inducement require specific intent to infringe a patent claim but not
allow a good faith belief of invalidity as a defense? Second, is there
an alternative context in which to think about induced infringement?
Finally, given the current legal tests, can we think about induced
infringement in a way that will yield clear and consistent outcomes in
patent infringement cases?
Given these questions, this paper makes several observations.
The current interpretation of the intent required for a finding of
induced infringement threatens to make patents that rely on
43.
See Global-Tech Appliances, supra note 18.
44.
See id.
45.
See id. at 2070-2071 (“a willfully blind defendant is one who takes deliberate actions
to avoid confirming a high probability of wrongdoing”).
46.
See Commil, supra note 19.
47.
See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 1367-68 (Fed. Cir. 2013).
48.
Commil, supra note 19.
49.
See id. at 1932 (Justice Scalia argues that eliminating the defense of a good faith
belief of invalidity is advantageous for patent trolls).
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inducement as an infringement theory almost unenforceable.50 First,
according to the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court, the alleged
inducer must intend to cause infringement of the patent.51
Unfortunately for a patentee, proving whether a corporation intended
to aid another corporation in infringing a patent is a difficult task.52
Second, the defense that an alleged inducer had a good faith belief
that that the patent is invalid may be revived in patent legislation as a
policy necessary to combat patent trolls.53
Taken together, the courts’ newest rulings do not seem to follow
Lemley’s sliding scale model. Under the current standard, it is clear
that liability for induced infringement requires the defendant to have
knowledge of the patent and intend to aid in acts that constitute
infringement or that the defendant (1) believes that facts exist relevant
to inducement and (2) the defendant deliberately avoids learning
those facts.54
The chart below is a graphical representation of the change in the
inducement standard (see Figure 2). In sum, the inducement inquiry is
shifting to a conduct independent one—a vast difference from
Lemley’s sliding scale formulation—and an incredibly hard standard
for patentees to meet.

50.
See Sichelman, supra note 4, at 343.
51.
See DSU, supra note 19; see also Commil, supra note 19 (holding that inducement
requires proof that the defendant knew her acts were infringing).
52.
See Rantanen, supra note 28, at 1610.
53.
See Commil, supra note 19, at 1932 (Justice Scalia dissenting).
54.
See Global-Tech, supra note 18.
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Figure 2
Three practical factors have emerged as relevant to induced
patent infringement. First, the public desires a clear test that results in
clear jury instructions.55 Current jurisprudence makes it difficult for
district courts to apply a clear legal test and provide juries with clear
legal instructions. Second, current technology allows parties to be
more interactive and collaborative which may have changed the way
courts view conduct that might give rise to induced infringement.56
Finally, the lack of clarity may diminish commercial participants’
ability to forecast whether they might be susceptible to infringement
liability, which in turn may hinder competition in growing technology
areas.57
In the context of the practical framework set forth above, this
article makes two prescriptive proposals. First, instead of continuing
to debate over the scienter required for inducement, courts and
commentators should acknowledge conduct as an equally important
element to the inducement inquiry. Second, the law should allow for
consideration of the relationship between the parties involved in the
alleged infringement—the accused inducer and direct infringer—as
helpful evidence of conduct in the inducement inquiry.

55.
See infra Part IV.A.2.; see also Commil, supra note 19, at 1929 (arguing in favor of
eliminating the good faith belief defense in service of “orderly administration of the patent
system).
56.
See infra Part IV.A.1.
57.
See infra Part IV.A.3.
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The fact that technology has become more collaborative fits
nicely with the idea that the law should refocus its attention on the
conduct of the parties and their relationship. Using conduct and the
relationship between the parties as a guide helps define boundaries for
inducement. The proposed balanced approach provides helpful
benchmarks that induced patent infringement law desperately needs.
A detailed discussion of the issues outlined above will proceed
as follows: Part I discusses several different technological
innovations. How the courts interpret the law of induced patent
infringement has a significant impact on patentees in these technology
areas. Given that context, Part II briefly explains the origin of induced
patent infringement. Part III summarizes existing viewpoints on
inducement and illustrates how much of the discussion about
inducement has been focused on understanding its intent requirement.
Part IV consists of two sections. The first section suggests a practical
framework for how judges, the legislature and policymakers should
think about induced patent infringement. The second section argues
that our understanding of induced patent infringement needs to be
rebalanced by (1) resisting the urge to continue tinkering with the
intent requirement and (2) focusing on the types of inducing conduct
the law should discourage. As a part of this recalibration, a closer
examination of the relationships between the accused inducer and
direct infringer may also provide a way of analyzing induced
infringement issues.
I. THE INNOVATION GAME AND INDUCED INFRINGEMENT
This part briefly summarizes some of the technologies that are
affected by how induced patent infringement is interpreted and
enforced.58 These modern technologies did not exist in 1952 when
Congress enacted the inducement statute.59 Evidence suggests that
there is a correlation between financial investment in technology and
strong patent protection.60 Accordingly, innovators in these interactive
and collaborative technology areas stand to benefit from a clear
inducement test that, in proper circumstances, allows them to enforce
58.
Portions of Part I are adapted from my article: W. Keith Robinson, Economic
Theory, Divided Infringement and Enforcing Interactive Patents, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1961 (2015).
59.
See Josh Rychlinski, Interactive Methods and Collaborative Performance: A New
Future for Indirect Infringement, 20 MICH. TELECOMM & TECH. L. REV. 215, 241 (2013).
60.
Michael N. Rader, Toward a Coherent Law of Inducement to Infringe: Why the
Federal Circuit Should Adopt the Hewlett-Packard Standard for Intent Under § 271(b), 10 FED.
CIR. B.J. 299, 330 (2001) (“’Investment capital tends to flow away from industries in which
patent protection is weakest 161 and flows instead to those industries in which it is strongest.’”)
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their patents against inducing third parties.
A. The Internet of Things
The IoT is an emerging field with numerous applications. It is a
platform of objects connected via a complex network61 and has slowly
grown as more smart devices become connected to the Internet.62
Bruce Sterling, a science fiction writer, popularized the idea of an
IoT. His vision predicted that physical objects connected to the
Internet would be traceable in space and time.63 In 2010, for the first
time in history, the number of connected devices outnumbered the
number of humans.64 In 2015, it was estimated that there was 25
billion connected devices as compared to only 7.2 billion people on
the planet.65 Technologies such as WiFi are allowing all these devices
to be connected and share information.66 Accordingly, Sterling’s
vision is close to becoming a reality.
Several IoT technology stakeholders exist. They include, but are
not limited to, integrated circuit manufacturers, manufacturers of
sensing equipment, network providers, system integrators, service
providers in addition to customers and users of IoT services.67 What
makes this platform appealing to technology stakeholders is its
potential to facilitate human interaction with smart devices such as
wearable devices.68
Generally, the IoT is defined as an “infrastructure of networked
physical objects.”69 This is a paradigm shift from the Internet Age
technology.70 Particularly, instead of simply facilitating human
interaction, the IoT allows devices to interact with the physical
environment, gather information from that environment and share it

61.
Gerd Kortuem et al., Smart Objects as Building Blocks for the Internet of Things,
IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING 44, 44 (2010).
62.
See Bello & Zeadally, supra note 1.
63.
Kortuem et al., supra note 61, at 48.
64.
Bello & Zeadally, supra note 1 (stating that “By 2010, the number of devices
connected to the Internet rose to 12.5 billion while the world’s population increased to 6.8
billion”).
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Peng-fei Fan & Guang-zhao Zhou, Analysis of the Business Model Innovation of the
Technology of Internet of Things in Postal Logistics, IEEE INTERNET COMPUTING 532, 532
(2011).
68.
Kortuem et al., supra note 61, at 51.
69.
Id. at 44.
70.
Bello & Zeadally, supra note 1 (“Akin to how humans are the users of the Internet,
devices (things) are the users of the IoT.”).
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with other devices, people or environments.71 Technologies and
equipment, in addition to the Internet, that provide the platform for
the IoT includes smart devices, information processing equipment and
device sensing equipment.72
Smart objects, devices with sensing, processing and
communication abilities, are the backbone of the IoT.73 Smart objects
can be used in nanotechnology, electromechanical systems or digital
electronics.74 These smart objects are connected via network systems
that have both short and long-range capabilities.75 Data captured by
smart objects can be transmitted via the network and may also be
stored using cloud computing applications.76
The typical application of IoT technology requires smart objects
to collect data and transmit that data to other devices or a central
analysis object.77 The smart objects are governed by policies that
allow them to collaborate with other smart objects or humans.78 Areas
in which IoT technology could be deployed are almost limitless—
transportation, finance, and health care are just a few examples.79
Because of its possible application to many daily activities, the
IoT is a tremendous growth area for innovation. New and innovative
routing protocols are needed to allow smart objects to communicate in
real-time.80 Improvements need to be made in device-to-device
communication.81 Further, there is an opportunity to create business
models and business methods that will make use of the IoT platform
in new and innovative ways.82 In sum, with the proliferation of
connected devices, the IoT will affect every person in every walk of

71.
Id.
72.
Fan & Zhou, supra note 67 (“The Internet of Things which bases on the Internet,
uses a variety of information sensing identification device and information processing
equipment, such as RFID, GPS, GIS, JIT, EDI, and other devices to combine with the Internet to
form an extensive network in order to achieve information and intelligence for Entity.”).
73.
Kortuem et al., supra note 61, at 44 (examples of smart objects include smart phones,
smart watches, tablets, thermostats, and vehicles).
74.
See Bello & Zeadally, supra note 1.
75.
Id. at 2
76.
Id. at 2
77.
Id. at 6.
78.
Id.
79.
Fan & Zhou, supra note 67, at 533.
80.
Bello & Zeadally, supra note 1.
81.
Id. at 3.
82.
Fan & Zhou, supra note 67, at 536-37 (explaining that business models are needed to
maximize the potential of the IoT in China).
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life.83
Stakeholders in IoT technology will most likely seek patents for
their inventions.84 Accordingly, induced infringement may be of
primary concern to patentees because of the interactive and
collaborative nature of IoT. However, the current interpretation of
induced infringement makes it unclear to what extent IoT multiparticipant patent claims could be enforced.
B. Personalized Medicine
Similar to the effect on IoT inventions, courts’ induced
infringement interpretation can have an impact on personalized
medicine inventions. Personalized medicine is a relatively new field
and includes a large number of small companies.85 The stakeholders
in personalized medicine technology include pharmaceutical, biotech
and genetic companies, institutions and organizations. These groups
are involved in the development of anything from therapeutic
healthcare products to agricultural applications.86
The field of personalized medicine relies on diagnostic tests.87
Medical professionals use these tests to obtain information about a
patient’s molecular and genetic markers.88 These markers reveal the
risk of disease, the presence or absence of a disease, and what a
patient’s response will be to certain drug therapies.89 Using this
information, healthcare providers can provide patient-specific

83.
Id. at 532.
84.
Gene Quinn, The Race to Dominate the Internet of Things, IPWATCHDOG,
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/02/15/the-race-to-dominate-the-internet-of-things/id=54698
(last visited Feb. 15, 2015).
85.
See Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae Myriad Genetics, Inc. in Support of Neither
Party at vii Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en
banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 895 (U.S. Jan. 10 2014) (No.12-786) (2009-1372)
2011 WL 3281836; Amicus Curiae Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization in Support of
Neither Party at 1 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 895 (U.S. Jan. 10 2014) (No.12-786)
(2009-1372) 2011 WL 3101890.
86.
Amicus Curiae Brief of Biotechnology Industry Organization in Support of Neither
Party at 1 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en
banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 895 (U.S. Jan. 10 2014) (No.12-786) (2009-1372)
2011 WL 3101890.
87.
Corrected Brief of Amicus Curiae Myriad Genetics, Inc. in Support of Neither Party
at 4 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc)
(per curiam), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 895 (U.S. Jan. 10 2014) (No.12-786) (2009-1372) 2011
WL 3281836.
88.
Id.
89.
Id.

16

SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J.

[Vol. 32

preventive care and treatment regimens that reduce healthcare costs.90
To provide these personalized services, the healthcare industry
has pushed to become more efficient and in doing so has developed
interactive systems and methods.91 For example, it may be more
efficient for one entity to perform the diagnostic testing and another
entity to correlate a detected marker with a disease or drug
treatment.92 Further, methods for treatment or drug delivery may
require the participation of multiple healthcare providers and
patients.93
Infringement under §271(b) is of particular interest to
personalized medicine because “[t]he steps of biotechnology method
patents are often capable of being practiced by separate entities.”94
Further, it is extremely time consuming and costly to develop
personalized medicine applications.95 Generally, this large investment
of time and money can only be protected by claims covering the
diagnostic and correlation processes of a personalized medicine
product.96 Personalized medicine stakeholders continue to develop
novel and interactive methods for diagnosing and treating medical
conditions.97 Accordingly, an interpretation of induced infringement
that is not sensitive to the personalized medicine industry could
devalue several patents and reduce the incentive to invest in
expensive and time-consuming research.98
C. Software and the Internet
The Internet created a unique set of challenges with respect to
patents. In addition to creating a way in which millions of people
could communicate, it also created an environment where users, by
themselves or in conjunction with companies, could infringe a
90.
Id. at 6 (the Prolans® test diagnoses a prostate tumor and correlates that diagnostic
information with a patient to help healthcare providers decide how to treat prostate cancer).
91.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of America on
Rehearing En Banc in Support of Neither Party at 5 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks,
Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. granted, 134 S. Ct. 895 (U.S.
Jan. 10 2014) (No.12-786) (2010-1291) 2011 WL 3101831.
92.
Myriad Genetics, supra note 87, at vii.
93.
Biotechnology Industry, supra note 86, at 8.
94.
Id. (citing Kling, Diagnosis or Drug? Will Pharmaceutical Companies or
Diagnostics Manufacturers Earn More from Personalized Medicine?, 8 EMBO REP. 903
(2007)).
95.
Myriad Genetics, supra note 87, at 8-9.
96.
Id. at 1-2.
97.
Pharmaceutical Research , supra note 91, at 2.
98.
Id. at 3.
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patent.99 Indirect infringement is seen as the only way to fairly
enforce Internet Age patents because it allows enforcement of
interactive patents without imposing liability on innocent actors.100
Another challenge for patent holders of inventions related to the
Internet is that they most likely involve software. Software developers
can be found liable for inducement if their customers use their
programs in a way that directly infringes a patent.101 Accordingly,
developers “must be aware that their sales, marketing, or advertising
activities must not promote, or encourage their customers to use the
product in an infringing process, lest they be found to be inducing
infringers.”102
Internet Age inventions can be characterized as inventions that
make use of the Internet and its associated technologies. Most of these
Internet applications necessitate the participation of multiple
participants. Some specific applications of Internet Age technology
include wireless technology103 , Internet retail104 , and financial
services.105 These industries have exploded in the last decade. Internet
retail use continues to grow in the U.S. with approximately 192
million users visiting 13 retail sites per month.106 The financial
services industry provides banking services to consumers107 who may
buy or sell goods using an Internet retailer.108 Financial services work
globally to facilitate an estimated 10,000 transactions per second
quickly and in a secure manner.109
Growth in demand for financial services and Internet retail has
been driven by the innovation and explosive growth in the wireless

99.
See Rychlinski, supra note 59, at 225.
100.
Id.
101.
See Erwin Basinski, Some Comments on Contributory and Induced Patent
Infringement: Implications for Software Developers, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 777
(1999).
102.
Id. at 786-87.
103.
Brief of Ctia—the Wireless Association® and Metropcs Wireless, Inc. at 2
McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Systems Corp., 2011 WL 4071472.
104.
Amici Curiae Internet Retailers’ Brief in Support of Defendant/Cross-Appellant’s En
Banc Response Brief at 2, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed.
Cir. 2012) (Nos. 2009-1372, 2009-1380, 2009-1416, 2009-1417) 2011 WL 3796786.
105.
Brief of Amicus Curiae the Financial Services Roundtable in Support of Limelight
Networks, Inc. and Affirmance at 3, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d
1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Nos. 2009-1372, 2009-1380, 2009-1416, 2009-1417) 2011 WL 7730148.
106.
Id. at 6.
107.
Id.
108.
Internet Retailers, supra note 104.
109.
Financial Services Roundtable, supra note 105, at 4.
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industry.110 The most mobile Internet users live in the U.S.111 “Apps,”
or applications that run on smart mobile devices have also contributed
to the growth of the wireless industry. The revenue generated from
mobile app sales was projected to increase 190% and surpass 15.1
billion dollars in 2011.112
Accordingly, the global economy has become dependent upon
this interconnected system of wireless devices, Internet storefronts
and financial services.113 Different companies and different systems
must interact to provide consumers with services that they have come
to expect.114 For example, a credit card transaction can involve six or
more participants.115 Therefore, different companies in different
technology areas may partner to provide connected web services.116
Partnering is more efficient for these companies and allows them to
specialize, which can result in higher quality service.117
Due in part to the innovative partnerships taking place in this
area, Internet Age companies are targets of an increasing number of
patent infringement lawsuits.118 For example, wireless carriers may be
sued based on methods that make use of their network.119 Internet
retailers are also sued for patent infringement “based in part on the
activities of their customers in visiting their websites.”120 These
lawsuits commonly rely on a theory of induced infringement.
Accordingly, due to the interactive nature of Internet Age technology,
the issue of induced infringement is of deep concern to Internet Age
industry companies. The next section discusses induced infringement

110.
Ctia, supra note 103, at 3 (“Advances in wireless technology have enabled explosive
innovation in the last decade. Ten years ago, consumers used cell phones almost exclusively to
make voice calls. Five years later, they were texting, sharing pictures, and surfing the
Internet.”).
111.
Id. at 5 (stating that 234 million or more Americans use mobile devices).
112.
Id. at 4.
113.
Financial Services Roundtable, supra note 105, at 4.
114.
Ctia, supra note 103, at 3.
115.
Financial Services Roundtable, supra note 105.
116.
Ctia, supra note 103, at 5 (“A good example is Sprint’s partnership with Google and
others to launch the Google Wallet app earlier this spring. This app provides a ‘wave and pay’
service through which consumers can pay at stores by simply waving their phones over a
scanner. The phones use a near field communications (‘NFC’) chip to communicate with the
scanner. The service involved not only Google, but also Samsung (which incorporated the NFC
chip in the phone), credit powerhouses Citi and MasterCard, merchant processing provider First
Data, and Sprint to provide the necessary network connection.”).
117.
Id.
118.
Financial Services Roundtable, supra note 105, at 12.
119.
Ctia, supra note 103, at 6.
120.
Internet Retailers, supra note 104.
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and details the debate about how courts should apply the law.
II. MOVING THE PAWN—INDIRECT INFRINGEMENT
This part provides an explanation of induced patent
infringement. It begins with a brief discussion of the historical
development of inducement. In 1952, Congress defined how a patent
could be indirectly infringed by enacting sections 35 U.S.C. § 271 (b)
and (c). Both sections (b) and (c) codified pre-1952 case law
concerning indirect infringement.121 In the last two decades, the
Federal Circuit and Supreme Court have attempted to clarify the law
of induced patent infringement.
A. Indirect Infringement
To understand indirect infringement, it is helpful to understand
what constitutes direct infringement. Direct infringement is defined
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) as “whoever without authority makes, uses,
offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States
or imports into the United States any patented invention during the
term of the patent therefor, infringes the patent.” Direct infringement
is determined by first properly construing the asserted patent claims
and then comparing the claims to the accused process or device.122 If
the accused process literally meets each and every claim limitation or
its substantial equivalent then the claim is directly infringed.123
Direct infringement is a strict liability tort. Accordingly, the
motives of the direct infringer—whether she made a mistake, lacked
knowledge of the patent, etc.—are irrelevant to the determination of
liability.124 Because of the strict liability imposed by direct
infringement, one commentator has warned against judicially
expanding the concept of direct infringement to cover other conduct
that is not considered direct infringement.125
Instead, the law evaluates other activity that may be infringing

121.
See CHISUM, supra note 16, at § 17.04[3].
122.
See Rader, supra note 60, at 302.
123.
See id. at 303 (“Literal infringement requires that the accused device or process meet
each and every limitation in the patent claim. If the accused device or process meets all but one
of the limitations in the claim, there is no infringement”).
124.
Kumar, supra note 29, at 733; See also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Petitioner at 11, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys. Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015) (No.
13-896) 2015 WL 349827 (“Under Section 271(a), a ‘direct infringer’s knowledge o1’ intent is
irrelevant’ to liability. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2065 n.2
(2011).”).
125.
See Rychlinski, supra note 59, at 229.
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under an indirect infringement theory.126 “Indirect infringement has
long been understood as the principle of joint tortfeasance applied to
the enforcement of patent rights.”127 These joint tortfeasers can
include those who supply components that contribute to the creation
of an infringing device or those who encourage another to directly
infringe a patent.128
An important right conferred with a patent is the capability of
enforcing the patent against indirect infringers.129 The purpose of
indirect in9ringement as a cause of action “is to provide a remedy for
patent holders when it is impossible or inefficient for them to sue
direct infringers, and to deter parties from engaging in behavior that
may result in the infringement of a patent.”130 For example, in some
cases the direct infringer is a purchaser or user who is judgment proof
or a future consumer.131 Therefore, it is economically and
commercially infeasible for the patent owner to sue this type of
consumer for direct infringement.132 However, the party who
encouraged or aided in the direct infringement may be more culpable
than the end consumer and direct infringer.133
Because of the nature of a cause of action under indirect
infringement, certain scienter standards must be met by the indirect
infringer to support a finding of liability. The scienter standard
codified in the statute is based on historical precedent.134 While
ambiguous on its face, the Supreme Court has held that liability under
both 271(b)135 and (c)136 require that the accused direct infringer have

126.
A cause of action for indirect infringement is set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) and (c).
127.
See Kumar, supra note 29, at 729.
128.
See Rader, supra note 60, at 299; see Sichelman, supra note 4, at 321 (“The Patent
Act of 1952 codified the historical precedents in sections 271(b) and 271(c)”); see also Basinski,
supra note 101, at 778 (explaining that section 271 was created to clarify patent misuse).
129.
See Rader, supra note 60, at 300.
130.
See Rantanen, supra note 28, at 1591; see also Lemley, supra note 4, at 228 (“The
goal of secondary liability is to give patent owners effective protection in circumstances in
which the actual infringer either is not the truly responsible party or is impractical to sue.”).
131.
Odin B. Roberts, Contributory Infringement of Patent Rights, 12 HARV. L. REV. 35,
39 (1898).
132.
See Rader, supra note 60, at 306.
133.
See Lemley, supra note 4, at 226.
134.
See Sichelman, supra note 4, at 309 (“courts have read both indirect infringement
provisions as including scienter thresholds”).
135.
Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer. 35
U.S.C. § 271(b).
136.
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United
States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or composition, or a
material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the
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had knowledge of the patent.137 Further, commentators and the
Supreme Court have characterized inducement as having an even
greater scienter requirement than contributory infringement because
liability under section 271(b) also requires that the alleged inducer
have intended to cause the infringement.138
As mentioned above, the law characterizes indirectly infringing
activities as either inducement or contributory infringement.139
Contributory infringement generally concerns selling or providing a
component that is then used to infringe a patent.140 To provide context
and contrast for this article’s discussion of inducement, the subsection
below briefly discusses contributory infringement.
B. Contributory Infringement
Contributory infringement is defined in 35 U.S.C. § 271(c). In
contrast to the inducement statute, 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) defines the
conduct that could subject an alleged contributory infringer to liability
in detail. For example, the statute specifies that the selling or
importation of a component of a patented item or for use in a patented
process is contributory infringement if the component constitutes a
material part of the invention and is not a staple article of
commerce.141 Further, the alleged infringer is required to know that
the component was especially made or adapted for use in infringing
the asserted patent.142
The concept of contributory infringement was fleshed out at
common law well before it was codified in the 1952 patent act. In
Wallace v. Holmes, a court held, for the first time, that a defendant
could be liable for infringement by supplying a component for use in
an infringing device.143 The patent at issue covered a 19th century
lamp which included a burner and a chimney. The defendants only
made and sold the burner, which had no other use than to be

invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for
substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
137.
See Sichelman, supra note 4, at 309.
138.
See id. at 341; see also Commil, supra note 19 (clarifying that liability for
inducement requires proof that the defendant knew her acts infringed the asserted patent).
139.
See id. at 309 (“Contributory infringement and inducement of infringement fall under
the general rubric known as ‘indirect infringement.”).
140.
See Lemley, supra note 4, at 227.
141.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
142.
Id.
143.
See generally Wallace v. Holmes, 29 F. Cas. 74 (C.C.D. Conn. 1871).
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combined with a chimney.144 Customers purchased the burner and
combined it with a chimney, the combination of which infringed the
asserted patent.145
While the court stated that simply selling the burner was not
infringement, it nevertheless held the defendants liable for aiding and
abetting infringement of the patent.146 One reason the defendants were
found to be liable was because they had the intent to make the burner
so that it would be combined with a component supplied by
consumers.147 However, as one commentator has argued it is
questionable whether the court in Wallace also required knowledge of
the patent.148
Later courts have fleshed out the scienter requirements for
contributory infringement. Liability for contributory infringement
now requires an examination of the alleged contributory infringer’s
knowledge and intent.149 In Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top
Replacement Co., Aro II, the Supreme Court determined that for there
to be liability for contributory infringement, the defendant must have
known about the patent and by their actions, intended to infringe the
patent.150 That is, the defendant had to have had the intent to cause the
actual infringement.151
While contributory infringement is designed as an alternative
way in which a patentee can enforce their patent rights, the concept of
contributory infringement does present some interesting challenges.
Most of the technology that is the subject of complex Internet Age
patents had yet be conceived when both Wallace and later in Aro II
occurred.152 Further, Internet Age technology did not exist in the

144.
See id. at 79; see also Rader, supra note 60, at 305 (“Contributory infringement was
Congress’s response to the problem of Wallace v. Holmes, in which the intent of the defendant
to infringe is manifest from the fact that the product sold has no substantial non-infringing
uses.”).
145.
See Wallace, supra note 143, at 79.
146.
See id.; see Rantanen, supra note 28, at 1593.
147.
See Wallace, supra note 143; Roberts, supra note 131, at 37.
148.
See Sichelman, supra note 4, at 313 (“Although the Wallace court’s test might
casually be read to require knowledge of the patent, the court held that scienter turned on the
‘certain knowledge that such burners are to be used, as they can only be used, by the addition of
a chimney.’”).
149.
DSU, supra note 19 (“[I]nducement requires that the alleged infringer knowingly
induced infringement and possessed specific intent to encourage another’s infringement.”).
150.
See Aro Mfg. Co. v. Convertible Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 525 (1964);
see Rychlinski, supra note 59, 221.
151.
See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 408.
152.
See Rychlinski, supra note 59.
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1950s when Congress wrote the statute. Thus, as one commentator
has argued, the statute seems “ill-equipped” to handle modern day
technologies.153
In contrast to contributory infringement, induced infringement is
much broader. It encompasses any behavior where one party
encourages or assists another to directly infringe a patent.154 However,
as discussed in the next section, that breadth has led to difficulty in
interpreting its requirements.
C. Induced Infringement
Theoretically, any conduct that is not captured by contributory
infringement that was actionable before 1952 is now covered by
inducement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).155 Induced infringement
imposes liability on an actor who causes another to directly infringe a
patent.156 Examples of inducement can include providing advice or
instructions that assists in direct infringement, repairing infringing
devices or otherwise controlling another’s infringing activities.157 The
plaintiff must show (1) that the induced conduct constitutes direct
infringement and (2) that the defendant had the requisite intent.158 The
requisite intent includes a showing that the defendant had knowledge
of the patent or was willfully blind to its existence and intended to
cause the infringement of the patent.159
The primary purpose of inducement is to provide a mechanism
for a patent holder to enforce her patent against third parties that the
law has deemed should be liable for causing infringement of the
asserted patent.160 The broad language of the inducement statute even
has the power to impose liability on the seller of a component with
substantially non-infringing uses.161 That is, inducement can be
153.
Id.
154.
See Sichelman, supra note 4, at 308.
155.
Section 271(b) of the Patent Act of 1952: Confusion Codified, 66 YALE L.J. 132, 139
(1956-1957) (hereinafter “Confusion Codified”); see Rantanen, supra note 28, at 1598
(explaining that 271(b) is open-ended language that covers various activities).
156.
See Lemley, supra note 4, at 228 (defining induce as causing a person to do
something he would not have done otherwise); Kumar, supra note 29, at 748 (“In 1952, the term
‘induce’ meant ‘[t]o lead on; to influence; to prevail on; to move by persuasion or influence.’ In
the context of the Patent Act, the adverb ‘actively’ suggests ‘the inducement must involve the
taking of affirmative steps to bring about the desired result.’”).
157.
Confusion Codified, supra note 155; see Rantanen, supra note 28, at 1598.
158.
See Rader, supra note 60, at 308.
159.
See Global-Tech, supra note 18.
160.
See Rader, supra note 60, at 306-07.
161.
See Rader, supra note 60, at 305.
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viewed as a “catchall” provision that captures activities that
contributory infringement does not.162 Further, inducement allows a
plaintiff to recover against someone other than direct infringers that
may be difficult to sue and judgment proof.163
It is well settled that liability for inducement cannot be imposed
without a finding of direct infringement.164 Thus, inducement involves
two actors—an inducer and a direct infringer.165 For example, in
Luten v. Town of Lee the court stated that direct infringement must
have occurred for there to be inducement.166 In that case, there was no
finding of inducement because actual direct infringement did not
occur.167 One commentator has concluded that inducement is hard to
prove because a plaintiff must show that direct infringement occurred
and in addition, must show that the defendant had the requisite intent
and knowledge of the patent.168
Although the language of the inducement statute is considerably
shorter than that of contributory infringement, several difficult
questions about how the law should interpret § 271(b) exist.169

162.
See Rantanen, supra note 28, at 1596.
163.
See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 400.
164.
See, e.g., DSU, supra note 19, at 1303 (“[T]he patentee always has the burden to
show direct infringement for each instance of indirect infringement.”). See CHISUM, supra note
16, at § 17.04[1] (“In Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai (2014), the Supreme Court confirmed
that a person may not “be liable for inducing infringement of a patent under 35 U. S. C. § 271(b)
when no one has directly infringed the patent under § 271(a) or any other statutory provision;
liability for inducement under Section 271(b) depends on a showing that the conduct being
induced constitutes direct infringement”); Charles Miller, Some Views on the Law of Patent
Infringement by Inducement, 53 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 86, 102 (1971) (“Liability under 35 U.S.C.
271(b) requires the existence of direct infringement by another party which is actionable under
35 U.S.C. 271(a)”).
165.
Basinski, supra note 101, at 778.
166.
See Luten v. Town of Lee, 206 F. 904 (D. Mass. 1913); see also Miller, supra note
164, at 104; see also Basinski, supra note 101, at 778 (“It is important to understand that,
without “direct infringement of the patent claims there can be neither contributory infringement
. . . nor inducement of infringement.”).
167.
See Miller, supra note 164, at 103 (explaining that direct infringement, existing or
threatened, is a prerequisite to a finding of induced infringement).
168.
See Gary N. Frischling, Miriam Bitton, Grokking Grokster: Has the Supreme Court
Changed Inducement Under Patent Law?, 34 AIPLA Q.J. 265, 273 (Summer, 2006); see also
Confusion Codified, supra note 155 at 140 (“the patentee suing under paragraph (b) must prove
that defendant’s conduct actually culminated in a direct infringement by a third party, and that
defendant intended this result. Even with this guide, however, it will often be difficult,
particularly with reference to paragraph (b), to determine whether defendant’s conduct violates
the statute.”).
169.
See Lemley, supra note 4, at 226 (“despite the venerable nature of inducement in
patent law, the actual requirements for inducement liability have remained something of a
mystery.”).
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Section 271(b) is ambiguous and thus has been interpreted both
broadly and narrowly.170 These varying interpretations are an attempt
to balance the idea of deterring infringing conduct against the use of
patents to stifle competition.171
Specifically, there continues to be some debate about what the
law requires regarding the intent and knowledge of the inducer.172
These issues go to a broader question of how involved the law
requires an inducer to be in the infringement of the asserted patent.173
The Supreme Court has held that both inducement and contributory
infringement require that the defendant have knowledge of the
asserted patent.174 Further, a plaintiff must show that the defendant
possessed specific intent to encourage infringement.175 Part of that
difficulty has been that in some instances the law requires an inquiry
into the state of mind of a corporation.176
D. Knowledge of the Patent and Induced Infringement
In order to succeed in a cause of action for induced infringement
a plaintiff must show that the defendant knew about the asserted
patent.177 In Aro II, a contributory infringement case, the Supreme
Court stated that liability for contributory infringement required the
defendant to have knowledge of the patent.178 Later in Global-Tech,
an inducement case, the Supreme Court stated that since contributory
infringement and inducement have the same origin, the same
knowledge requirement must also apply to inducement.179 One policy
rationale for the knowledge requirement is that it limits liability to a
specific set of defendants—thus, allowing some limited enforcement
of the patent without stifling competition in a particular industry.180
Proponents of the knowledge requirement have found historical
support for the proposition in pre-1952 case law and the legislative
170.
Confusion Codified, supra note 155, at 138; see also Rychlinski, supra note, 59 at
220 (“§ 271(b) has been under attack since its very enactment. Some wrote that the section is
merely a nebulous statute which will create difficulties with deciding which activities violate the
statute. Others believed that it would ‘produce new interpretative problems.’”).
171.
See Rantanen, supra note 28, at 1591.
172.
See Lemley, supra note 4, at 226.
173.
See id. at 231.
174.
See Global-Tech, supra note 18; see also Rychlinski, supra note 59, at 222.
175.
See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 1578.
176.
See Rantanen, supra note 28, at 1610.
177.
See Global-Tech, supra note 18, at 2068.
178.
See Aro Mfg., supra note 150.
179.
See Global-Tech, supra note 18, at 2067.
180.
Kumar, supra note 29, at 730.
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history of the 1952 act.181 A.B. Dick is one of the earliest cases that
indicates that the defendant must have had knowledge of the patent in
order to be liable for indirect infringement.182 One rationale for this
view is that it would relieve the pressure placed on manufacturers and
purchasers of unpatented components.183 In other words, they would
not be liable for infringement unless they had knowledge of an
asserted patent. Donald Chisum also endorses the knowledge
requirement and argues that pre-1952 cases required a showing of
knowledge and intent—especially in cases that today would be
considered inducement cases.184
Despite the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the statute as
requiring knowledge of the patent, several commentators have argued
that there are crucial disadvantages. One commentator has argued that
there are a number of alleged infringers that have no knowledge of the
asserted patent at the beginning of the lawsuit.185 Further, the inquiry
into what an infringer—an individual or a corporation—knew could
be too complicated an undertaking for a court.186
There is also some historical support for the argument that the
scienter requirement for section 271(b) should not require knowledge
of the patent.187 Specifically, pre-1952 cases did not require a showing
of knowledge of the patent for a finding of indirect infringement.188
For example, one commentator interprets Wallace v. Holmes as not
requiring knowledge of the patent.189 Instead, he argues that the only
knowledge required of the defendant by the Wallace court was the
specific intent that the burners could be used with chimneys.190
Professor Sichelman noted that several cases that cite the
Wallace decision do not require the alleged defendant to have had

181.
See id. at 735-41, 750-55.
182.
See Sichelman, supra note 4, at 319; see also Kumar, supra note 29 (explaining that
the court’s statement makes knowledge a sufficient condition to find liability but not a necessary
condition).
183.
See Sichelman, supra note 4, at 329.
184.
See CHISUM, supra note 16, at §17.04[1].
185.
See Sichelman, supra note 4, at 310.
186.
See Kumar, supra note 29, at 743 (proposing an objective standard for the mental
state inquiry in order to determine inducement liability).
187.
For a lengthy discussion see Sichelman, supra note 4.
188.
See Sichelman, supra note 4, at 322; Kumar, supra note 29, at 730 (“But careful
analysis of eighty years of precedent prior to the 1952 Act suggests courts did not require
knowledge of the infringed patent to prove liability.”)
189.
See Sichelman, supra note 4, at 313.
190.
See id. at 313-314.
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knowledge of the patent.191 Further, another article that is cited in the
Global-Tech case also emphasized that in many 19th century cases,
knowledge of the patent was not relevant.192 Sichelman also argued
that there is no support in the legislative history of the 1952 act for the
requirement that there must be knowledge of the patent under 271(b)
and (c) .193
In further support of the argument that Congress did not intend
to import a knowledge requirement into the statute, the testimony of
then Judge Giles Rich is often cited.194 Judge Rich stated that to
knowingly sell a component of a patented machine did not mean that
the seller had to know the machine itself was patented.195
There are some benefits to interpreting 271 (b) as not requiring
knowledge.196 One commentator has argued that Congress did not
intend for ignorance of a patent to excuse alleged infringers from
liability.197 Published patents are publicly available and therefore
provide constructive notice of the patented invention.198 Further,
requiring knowledge of the patent makes inducement harder to prove
and thus, those patents susceptible to induced infringement harder to
enforce.199 This higher bar for patent enforcement may in turn
discourage corporations from investing in patent technologies
particularly susceptible to induced infringement.200
III. CONFLICTING INTERPRETATIONS OF INTENT
In its Commil decision, the Supreme Court clarified that in
addition to knowledge of the patent, liability for inducement required
proof that the defendant knew her acts constituted infringement of the
asserted patent.201 Prior to this decision, there was an ongoing debate
about the level of intent required to prove induced infringement.
Specifically, whether an alleged inducer must (1) have intent to cause
the acts that lead to infringement or (2) have intent to cause
191.
See id. at 315.
192.
See id.at 316.
193.
See id. at 321.
194.
See, e.g., Sichelman, supra note 4, at 322.
195.
See id. at 327.
196.
For a lengthy discussion see generally Sichelman, supra note 4.
197.
See Kumar, supra note 29, at 731.
198.
See id. at 753.
199.
See id. at 756.
200.
Id.
201.
See Commil, supra note 19 (clarifying that liability for inducement requires proof
that the defendant knew her acts infringed the asserted patent).
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infringement. While settled at the judicial level, these views along
with the question of whether a good faith belief that a patent is invalid
should be a defense to induced infringement could gain new life in
patent reform proposals or future legal challenges. For that reason,
this part analyzes the various views concerning the intent requirement
for induced infringement. Further, it suggests that the current trend in
induced infringement analysis places too much emphasis on the
question of intent.
A. Intent Generally
One of the key requirements that sets indirect infringement apart
from direct infringement is that liability for indirect infringement has
a scienter requirement.202 The intent of the third party infringer is a
key element in a cause of action under both contributory infringement
and inducement, because absent intent, the conduct itself would not
be actionable.203 Sections 271(b) and (c) codify pre-1952 case law
with respect to the requisite intent.204 Section 271(c) implies an
alleged contributory infringer’s intent by specifying that a subject
component must not have any substantial non-infringing use—
concluding that the only reason for selling such a component would
be for use in an infringing product.205 Similarly, evidence of intent is a
required element of any claim under inducement.206
Historically, intent was evidenced by the conduct or actions of
the alleged indirect infringer.207 For example, in Thomas-Houston
Electric Co. v. Kelsey Electric Railway Specialty Co., the court
identified the defendant’s “willingness to sell to people it knew might
be infringing and even those who might or might not be” as sufficient
evidence of intent.208 Similarly, in Wallace, the defendant’s actions—
manufacturing a burner only for use with a user supplied chimney—
were intentional and thus exposed the defendant to liability.209
The first Supreme Court case after 1952 to address inducement

202.
See, id.
203.
Roberts, supra note 131, at 37 (“The infringement of patent rights is a tort; here there
is an instance where the intent of a factor makes an act which in itself is innocent, a tort.”).
204.
See Rader, supra note 60, at 312.
205.
Id.
206.
See id.
207.
See Lemley, supra note 4, at 227.
208.
See Lemley, supra note 4, at 236; see also Thomson-Houston Elec. Co. v. Kelsey
Elec. Ry. Specialty Co., 75 F. 1005 (2d Cir. 1896).
209.
See Wallace, supra note 143.
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under 271(b) was Global-Tech.210 In this case, the Federal Circuit had
previously held that induced infringement required that the alleged
infringer have knowledge of the patent and know that his actions
would induce infringement.211 On appeal, the question presented to
the Supreme Court was whether an inducer must “know that the
induced acts constitute patent infringement.”212
The Supreme Court clarified that knowledge of the patent that
was infringed or willful blindness of that fact was required for a
showing of inducement.213 The knowledge requirement already
existed for 271(c), thus the Court reasoned it was logical that the
same mens rea requirement also be applicable to 271(b) since both
provisions were derived from similar common law.214
Several commentators have criticized the Supreme Court’s
holding concerning the knowledge requirement for inducement.215
One commentator argues that the Court misread the 1952 Patent
Act.216 Specifically, it is argued that there is no evidence that
Congress intended to modify the mens rea requirement for indirect
infringement from what it was before 1952.217 A further argument is
that the Global-Tech test is so strict as to make inducement an
incredibly high bar to meet.218
Despite its attempt to clarify the knowledge requirement, the
Global-Tech court left unresolved the question of what degree of
intent is required for inducement liability.219 Specifically, the Court
stated only that some intent was required.220 However, in GlobalTech, the Supreme Court did not “clearly resolve whether the
defendant must additionally possess actual knowledge that the
induced conduct constitutes infringement.”221 One commentator has
asserted that the holding in Global-Tech created a rule where a court
210.
See Global-Tech, supra note 18.
211.
Id.
212.
See id.
213.
See id.
214.
See Sichelman, supra note 4, at 339; See Rychlinski, supra note 59, at 222 (“[T]he
Supreme Court concluded in 2011 that § 271(b) imposes the same mens rea requirement as §
271(c).”); see also CHISUM, supra note 16, at 17.04[2].
215.
See, e.g., Sichelman, supra note 4, at 307.
216.
See Sichelman, supra note 4, at 331.
217.
See id. at 340.
218.
See id. at 310, 343.
219.
See United States, supra note 124, at 9-10 (explaining that resolving the Global-Tech
case did not require the Court to decide between two views of 271(b)).
220.
See id. at 2; Global-Tech, supra note 18, at 2065, 2068.
221.
See United States, supra note 124, at 9.
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must weigh evidence regarding the intent of the alleged inducer
without providing any benchmarks to make such a determination.222
Accordingly, several commentators have called for the judiciary
to clarify the intent requirement.223 The text of the statute is silent on
intent.224 Further, some commentators believe that the Federal Circuit
has failed to clarify what type of intent is required for a finding of
inducement under 271(b).225
The issue is whether section 271(b) requires the alleged infringer
to generally intend to induce the acts that led to infringement or to
specifically intend to induce the infringement itself.226 Another way to
state the latter test is to ask whether the defendant knew and intended
for the induced party to infringe the asserted patent.227 The Federal
Circuit generated the initial controversy by issuing two opinions that
used two different standards for assessing the type of intent required
for inducement liability.228 Supposedly, this controversy was
addressed in a subsequent Federal Circuit opinion.229 In DSU, the
Federal Circuit sitting en banc held that liability under 271(b)
required a showing of specific intent to cause infringement.230
However, even after the DSU decision, commentators have called for
further revision of the intent requirement in the name of clarity.231
One place commentators have looked to for clarity is the
Supreme Court. The resolution of the issues in Global-Tech did not
require the Supreme Court to address what type of intent is required
under 271(b).232 In response, the Court’s decision in Commil—at the
suggestion of the Solicitor General233 —makes clear that liability for
inducement requires (1) knowledge of the patent and (2) knowledge

222.
See Frischling et al., supra note 168, at 284.
223.
See Rader, supra note 60, at 300.
224.
See id. at 311.
225.
See id. at 300; At one point even the Federal Circuit itself acknowledged there was a
lack of clarity. Insituform Technologies, Inc. v. Cat Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed.
Cir. 2004).
226.
See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 404; Tal Kedem, Secondary Liability for Actively
Inducing Patent Infringement: Which Intentions Pave the Road, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1465,
1466 (2007).
227.
See Kedem, supra note 226, at 1469.
228.
See id. at 1466.
229.
See DSU, supra note 19, at 1293.
230.
See id. at 1306.
231.
See CHISUM, supra note 16, at § 17.04[2].
232.
Id.; See United States, supra note 124, at 11.
233.
See United States, supra note 124, at 20.
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that the induced acts infringe the asserted patent.234 At the time of this
writing, it is too early to understand what, if any impact, this
clarification of the law will have. To place the Court’s findings into
context, the next two sections explain the arguments on both sides of
the debate.
B. Intent to Cause the Acts that Cause Infringement
A popular, although seemingly incorrect view of inducement is
that only some form of general intent should be required to satisfy
section 271(b). Under this view, the question is: did the defendant
intend to induce the acts that caused infringement?235 In contrast, the
opposing “specific” intent view is that liability under § 271(b)
requires that the defendant intended to infringe the asserted patent.236
This section summarizes the former, general intent approach.
There is historical support for the general intent view. One
commentator has argued that court decisions before the 1952 Patent
Act adhered to the general intent standard because they did not
require that the defendant have knowledge of the patent.237 The only
showing that was required with respect to intent was that the alleged
defendant intended to cause the acts of the third party that led to
infringement of the patent.238 This interpretation is further supported
by the common law of torts which did not require an indirect
tortfeasor to know that the actions she caused to happen where
themselves unlawful.239
One of the most recent cases that seemed to support the general
intent interpretation was Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc.240 HP was the assignee of the LaBarre patent, which was directed
to a two-dimensional plotter that moved paper using grit-covered
wheels.241 Houston Instruments, a division of Bausch & Lomb (B&L),

234.
See Commil, supra note 19 (rejecting Commil and the Government’s argument and
holding that liability for inducement requires proof that the defendant knew her acts infringed
the asserted patent).
235.
See Rader, supra note 60, at 322.
236.
See id.
237.
Sichelman, supra note 4, at 310.
238.
See id. at 315; see also Rantanen, supra note 28, at 1597 (“Thus, ‘intent’ in the
context of inducement primarily meant intent to engage in the underlying acts, as opposed to
fault with respect to whether or not the conduct infringed a patent.”)
239.
See Sichelman, supra note 4, at 317.
240.
Hewlett-Packard, supra note 19, at 1466-67.
241.
Id.
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sold plotters with grit-covered wheels.242 B&L agreed to sell Houston
Instruments to Ametek. As a part of the agreement B&L indemnified
Ametek against liability for infringing the LaBarre patent.243 HP sued
B&L, asserting that B&L induced Ametek to infringe the LaBarre
patent by agreeing to indemnify Ametek.244
One issue before the Federal Circuit was to identify the type of
knowledge and intent necessary under § 271(b).245 In response, the
Federal Circuit held that under inducement, intent required “proof of
actual intent to cause the acts which constitute the infringement.”246 In
other words, a showing of intent only required a showing that the
defendant aided in the performance of the infringing acts even if the
defendant did not know of the patent or believe that those acts would
infringe the patent.247 One commentator has characterized this
standard as a very low bar.248
Despite that fact, the Federal Circuit found that B&L did not
induce Ametek to infringe the LaBarre patent. The court held that
B&L’s act of entering into an indemnity agreement with Ametek was
not active inducement.249 Accordingly, the conduct in question—
entering into an indemnity agreement—was not evidence of the
requisite intent required to cause acts that led to infringement.250
Instead, the court stated that entering into the indemnity agreement
was simply evidence that B&L was interested in getting a deal done
with Ametek.251
The HP case has had a tremendous influence on the conversation
regarding inducement and intent. One asserted advantage of the
general intent test articulated in HP is that potential defendants could
not shield themselves from liability by obtaining a non-infringement
opinion.252 This would simplify the analysis because the good faith
242.
See id.
243.
Id.
244.
Id.
245.
See id. at 1469.
246.
Id.
247.
See Rader, supra note 60, at 314; Lemley, supra note 4, at 238.
248.
See Lemley, supra note 4, at 238.
249.
See Hewlett-Packard, supra note 19, at 1469-70.
250.
See id.
251.
See id.
252.
See Rader, supra note 60, at 314 (“Under the Hewlett-Packard standard, if a court
later determines that such use of the device does infringe that patent, the company could be
found liable for inducement to infringe despite the opinion of counsel because the company
intended to cause its customers to undertake the infringing acts.”). A second advantage is that
the general intent standard clearly delineates between infringement and willful infringement. See
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belief of the alleged inducer concerning whether they infringed the
patent would not be relevant.253 In turn, this would strengthen
patentees’ ability to enforce their patents.
Conversely, one commentator argues that the general intent
standard would only increase competition and maintain or increase
the number of invalid patents that exist.254 It may also unduly broaden
the net within which potential infringers could be ensnared.255 To
counteract the view that patentees would be able to enforce their
patents more easily under a general intent standard, another
commentator has recommended that concerned parties seek
declaratory judgments to reduce their chances of inducing another to
infringe the patent.256 These concerns and others have led some,
including the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court to endorse a
stricter “specific intent” view, which is discussed in detail below.
C. Specific Intent to Cause Infringement
The specific intent standard operates in stark contrast to the
general intent standard described in the previous subsection. The
specific intent standard states that inducement under 35 U.S.C. §
271(b) requires a showing that the alleged infringer intended to
induce infringement of the patent instead of just intending to cause
the infringing acts.257 This standard is interpreted as narrower than the
general intent standard and is considered the appropriate standard by
several commentators, the Federal Circuit and most recently, the
Supreme Court.258
There is some historical justification for the specific intent
standard. Both sections 271(b) and (c) were written to codify the law
regarding indirect infringement. In Aro II, the Supreme Court held
that section 271(c) required the alleged infringer to know that “the
combination for which his component was especially designed was
both patented and infringing.”259 Section 271(c) has been interpreted
as focusing on actual infringement.260 In turn, one commentator has
argued that section 271(b) should also be focused on inducing actual
Holbrook, supra note 4, at 405.
253.
See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 405.
254.
See id. at 409.
255.
See id. at 405.
256.
See Kumar, supra note 29, at 743.
257.
See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 408; Lemley, supra note 4, at 245.
258.
See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 408; see also Commil, supra note 19.
259.
See Afr Mfg., supra note 150.
260.
See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 401-02.
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infringement and not just acts that cause infringement.261
The Federal Circuit used the specific intent approach in deciding
Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc.262 Specifically, the court
stated that an alleged inducer must have knowingly induced the
infringement.263 Manville was the assignee of a patent related to a
luminaire assembly for a light fixture that made it easier to access and
maintain the luminaires.264 Paramount made a similar assembly after
receiving a drawing of Manville’s patented device from Butterworth,
who had been given the drawing by DiSimone.265 The district court
held that DiSimone and Butterworth induced Paramount to infringe
the patent. The defendants appealed to the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit stated that in order to succeed on an
inducement claim, Manville had to show that the defendant intended
to infringe the patent. That is, that DiSimone and Butterworth knew
or should have known that providing the drawing would induce
Paramount to actually infringe the patent.266 Accordingly, the Federal
Circuit reversed the district court’s findings of inducement because
the defendants were not aware of the patent until after the lawsuit was
filed, and they obtained an opinion of counsel indicating that they did
not infringe the patent.267 In sum, the court found that there was
insufficient evidence that either party intended to cause Paramount to
infringe the Manville patent.268
Several commentators have endorsed the Manville standard.
Specifically, Professor Holbrook argues that the standard encourages
competition.269 For example, a business would not be discouraged
from entering into a market where their competitor owned a patent if
the business had received an opinion that it did not infringe the
patent.270
Despite this valid argument, the specific intent standard applied
in the Manville decision also received a negative reaction for several
reasons. First, the outcome has led some to believe that an opinion of
counsel would shield alleged defendants from all induced
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.
267.
268.
269.
270.

See id. at 408.
See Manville, supra note 19.
See id. at 547-548.
See id.
Id.
See id. at 553-554.
See id.
See id.
See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 408-09.
See id. at 408.
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infringement claims.271 In turn, this would make infringement suits
that rely on an induced infringement theory virtually unwinnable
against a defendant that could obtain a non-infringement opinion.272
Accordingly, one commentator has argued that the specific intent
standard encourages opportunistic behavior, discourages settlement
and should be less favored than the general intent standard articulated
in Hewlett-Packard.273
Second, the Manville decision seemed to contradict the Federal
Circuit’s earlier decision in Hewlett-Packard.274 Consequently,
district courts applied either standard with mixed results.275
In response to the split within the Federal Circuit, the Federal
Circuit’s DSU decision asserted that section 271(b) requires a
defendant have specific intent to induce the infringing acts. The
decision was significant for two reasons. First, it distinguished
between the different standards articulated in Manville and HewlettPackard. Second, the Federal Circuit decided DSU after the Supreme
Court’s decision in Global-Tech, which failed to address the requisite
intent required under section 271(b). Specifically, the Federal Circuit,
sitting en banc, stated that inducement required evidence that the
alleged inducer had knowledge of the patent and knew that the
induced conduct would infringe the patent.276
Recently, in Commil, the Supreme Court weighed in on the
requisite intent required for inducement liability. The Court stated that
inducement under Global-Tech “requires proof the defendant knew
the acts were infringing.”277 Under this specific intent standard, the
belief of the alleged inducer is a central inquiry.278 There are
examples of cases where the requisite specific intent was held to be
lacking because the defendant did not believe its actions or products
infringed the asserted patent.279
Accordingly, the debate regarding intent is part of a broader
discussion about how the law should balance the rights of a patent
271.
See Rader, supra note 60, at 324.
272.
See id. at 330.
273.
See id. at 332-333.
274.
See id. at 315-316 (“[T]he Manville Sales opinion has created a great deal of
confusion as to what the correct standard ought to be for intent under § 271(b).).
275.
See id. at 320-321.
276.
See DSU, supra note 19.
277.
See Commil, supra note 19 (clarifying that liability for inducement requires proof
that the defendant knew her acts infringed the asserted patent).
278.
See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 405.
279.
See CHISUM, supra note 16, at § 17.04[2].
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owner with society’s interest in not being subject to a monopoly by
weak patents. The Hewlett-Packard approach is likely to ensnare a
broader range of actors.280 Further, under the general intent standard,
a defendant could not rely on an incorrect non-infringement opinion
as a defense to inducement.281 In contrast, a non-infringement opinion
under the specific intent standard “provides a safe harbor for those
who believe their acts are not infringing, although this harbor only
protects against past damages and not prospective relief.”282
Interestingly, courts have identified specific inducing conduct as
evidence of the intent required to find induced infringement.283 For
example, designing an infringing product and providing instructions
to a third party for making or using an infringing product have been
identified as conduct that evidence an intent to induce infringement.284
Another example of conduct that evidences specific intent can be
found in Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd.285 There, the
defendant aided the direct infringer in making the infringing product
and created instructions for the customer on how to use the product.286
Thus, refocusing the induced infringement analysis to also
acknowledge and examine inducing conduct seems to be a way to
include additional benchmarks in the inducement inquiry without
continuing to tinker with the interpretation of intent.
D. Alternative Interpretations of Intent
In response to the debate regarding the requisite intent required
under section 271(b), scholars and commentators have proposed a
number of ways of understanding and solving the problem. This
subsection summarizes some of those concerns. It also highlights the
fact that a greater understanding of the conduct required to satisfy
section 271(b) has been generally absent from the discussion.
There are several commentators who believe that the specific
intent standard endorsed by the Supreme Court in Commil and
articulated by the Federal Circuit in Manville and DSU is the correct

280.
See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 405.
281.
See Rader, supra note 60, at 321.
282.
See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 407; See Rader, supra note 60, at 324 (“In fact,
Manville Sales has at least ‘led to wide speculation that an opinion of counsel may avoid
liability for inducement of infringement.’).
283.
See Lemley, supra note 4, at 227.
284.
See Rader, supra note 60, at 313; See Lemley, supra note 4, at 227.
285.
See Water Technologies Corp. v. Calco, Ltd., 850 F.2d 660 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
286.
Id.
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standard.287 Professor Holbrook has argued that the proper standard is
one that requires the inducer to have specific intent to aid in the
infringement of the asserted patent.288 In his essay, Professor
Holbrook also addresses a primary argument against the specific
intent standard, which is that defendants will use opinions of counsel
to negate evidence of specific intent. Holbrook argues that the
exercise of obtaining non-infringement or invalidity opinions is procompetitive.289 Further, opinions are generally used to assess risk and
not as a pre-emptive measure to avoid inducement liability.290
Accordingly, Professor Holbrook concludes that specific intent is the
proper standard and that a good faith belief of non-infringement or
invalidity are appropriate defenses to inducement.291
One commentator views the two intent standards as not at odds,
but instead on a continuum.292 On that continuum, a showing of intent
to cause the acts that led to infringement is a prerequisite to a finding
that a defendant specifically intended to induce infringement.293
Under this formulation, for liability to attach, the plaintiff must
ultimately present evidence of specific intent. The author argues that
this explains the decision in Manville.294 There, DiSimone and
Butterworth generally intended that the infringing device be
manufactured, however, the Federal Circuit found that they did not
specifically intend to infringe the patent.295
In contrast, Professor Sichelman has argued that the Global-Tech
decision was wrongly decided and purposefully obfuscates case law
that came before 1952.296 Specifically, the Court erred in interpreting
§ 271(b) as requiring knowledge of the patent.297 In support of this

287.
See Kedem, supra note 226, at 1495 (“The Manville standard should be and, in fact,
already is the proper scienter standard for active inducement under § 271(b); proper
interpretation of the Federal Circuit’s holdings in Hewlett-Packard and Manville, particularly in
light of the Federal Circuit’s rules on stare decisis, shows that concern about a ‘split’ is
unfounded.”).
288.
See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 400.
289.
See id. at 411.
290.
See id.
291.
See id. at 408-412.
292.
See Kedem, supra note 226, at 1467.
293.
See id. at 1479-1480 (“Manville, then, is far from Hewlett-Packard’s Manichaean
opposite, and is more properly understood as continuing the active inducement scienter analysis
that was not required of the court in Hewlett-Packard.”).
294.
See id.
295.
See Manville, supra note 19.
296.
See Sichelman, supra note 4, at 310, 336.
297.
See id. at 340.
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assertion, Sichelman notes that before Global-Tech, the Supreme
Court had never required “knowledge by the aider and abettor that he
was assisting in the breach of a legal duty.”298 Sichelman argues that
requiring knowledge of the patent under 271(b) makes inducement
too difficult to prove.299 Further, he asserts that opinions of counsel
too easily immunize potential defendants from liability.300
Professor Mark Lemley has argued that district courts decide
inducement cases using a sliding scale approach. That is, “a more
specific intent to infringe is required to find liability if the defendant’s
conduct is less egregious.”301 Conversely, the more egregious a
defendant’s conduct, the less intent should be required for a finding of
liability.302 Lemley describes the desired result of his approach as
follows:
Only those who intend at least the physical acts that constitute
infringement will be liable; neither those who merely know of
infringement without intending to encourage it nor those who idly
suggest a course of action without any desire that it actually occur
will be held liable under the law.303
Accordingly, Lemley’s sliding scale approach at least
acknowledges that conduct can play a role in induced infringement
analysis. However, the Federal Circuit seems to disfavor a “sliding
scale” approach where intent is a consideration.304 Further, in the
wake of DSU, Global-Tech and Commil, any inquiry into the conduct
of the accused inducer has received less attention.
Miller has suggested that the best way to understand section
271(b) is in how it interacts with section 271(c). In particular, Miller
argues that viewing sections 271(b) and (c) as overlapping reconciles
many of the court decisions that interpret what is required to show
intent differently.305 Miller argues that inducement cases are decided
based in part on whether the alleged inducer was the proximate cause
of the direct infringement.306 In sum, Miller’s approach to inducement
298.
See id. at 310.
299.
See id. at 343.
300.
Id.
301.
See Lemley, supra note 4, at 242.
302.
See id.
303.
See id. at 244.
304.
See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton-Dickson, Inc. 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (explaining that a district court should not use a sliding scale approach in an equitable
conduct determination where evidence of (1) intent and (2) materiality are both required).
305.
See Miller, supra note 164, at 97.
306.
See id. at 103.
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requires “[k]nowledge that direct infringement can occur and intent
that it will occur.”307
In response to varying views, several commentators have
suggested that the induced infringement analysis shift to a more
objective standard.308 The goal of an objectiveness approach is to
eliminate the need to inquire about what an alleged inducer intended
to do or whether they should have predicted that infringement would
occur.309 Further, opinions of counsel would not shield defendants
under an objective or strict liability standard because liability would
be based on whether it would have been obvious that there was a high
risk that the inducer’s conduct would result in the patent being
infringed.310 Accordingly, the lower the risk of infringement, the less
likely an accused inducer would be found liable for inducement.311
In sum, there are numerous ways in which commentators have
framed the debate regarding section 271(b). Most of the debate has
centered squarely on what type of intent is required to impose liability
on an alleged inducer. Stakeholders in this area of the law have
largely ignored or forgotten the conduct inquiry.
E. The Changing Environment
This section briefly describes the current state of induced
infringement analysis. The current scienter requirement for
inducement specifies the alleged inducer must have had knowledge of
the patent or been willfully blind to its existence, and specifically
intended to induce acts that he knew would infringe the asserted
patent.312
Because of these requirements, a number of defenses were
307.
See id. at 98.
308.
See, e.g., Rantanen, supra note 28, at 1581.
309.
See Kumar, supra note 29, at 742; Rantanen, supra note 28, at 1610 (“The first
problem with attempting to use mental state concepts in the context of patent infringement is the
difficulty-and perhaps impossibility-associated with ascertaining the mental state of a
corporation.”).
310.
See Kumar, supra note 29, at 744; Rantanen, supra note 28, at 1581.
311.
See Rantanen, supra note 28, at 1624 (“Copying a patented product, for example, is a
high-risk activity. Hiring employees who worked on a competitor’s product might similarly be a
high-risk activity. In contrast, independently developing technology and verifying through
infringement analyses that that technology is unrelated to any of a competitor’s patents would be
a low risk activity.”).
312.
See DSU, supra note 19; see also Rantanen, supra note 28, at 1601 (“The Federal
Circuit’s en banc resolution of the conflict between the Hewlett-Packard and Manville lines in
DSU can be seen as recognition of this multi-element approach. In DSU, the Federal Circuit
concluded that inducement requires both intent to cause the infringing acts and some degree of
knowledge that those acts infringe.”).
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believed to be available to potential induced infringers. One that was
particularly controversial was that if the alleged inducer has a good
faith belief that the patent was invalid or not infringed then he cannot
be liable for induced infringement.313 The reason why this strategy
was so controversial is that it manifested itself in the form of opinions
of counsel. Specifically, opponents of this defense feared that an
invalidity opinion could be used as evidence that an alleged inducer
had a good faith belief that an asserted patent was invalid.314
The issues raised in the Commil case are examples of the
controversies that have been created by the confusion surrounding the
type of intent required for liability under § 271(b). Commil’s patent is
directed to a method for implementing wireless networks.315 Commil
sued Cisco, alleging that Cisco directly infringed its patent and that
Cisco induced its customers to also infringe Commil’s patent.316 In
response, Cisco submitted evidence that it had a good faith belief that
the patent was invalid and thus lacked the requisite intent to induce
infringement.317
The main issue before the Federal Circuit was whether Cisco
possessed the requisite intent for a finding of inducement, given that it
believed the Commil patent was invalid.318 In a previous decision, the
Federal Circuit held that a good faith belief of non-infringement was a
defense to inducement.319 In the court’s view, there was no
meaningful difference between using non-infringement and invalidity
as a defense.320 Accordingly, the court held that evidence that the
accused infringer had a good faith belief that the asserted patent was
invalid could negate the requisite intent required for inducement
liability.321 The court seemed to indicate that despite a valid defense, a
good faith belief in invalidity could be overcome, but it is unclear
how or under what circumstances.322
In May of 2015, the Supreme Court determined (6-2) that the
Federal Circuit “erred in holding that a person who knowingly
induces another to engage in infringing conduct may avoid liability
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.

See Miller, supra note 164, at 130.
Kedem, supra note 226, at 1492; See Kumar, supra note 29, at 744.
See U.S. Patent No. 6,430,395 (filed Feb. 16, 2001).
See Commil, supra note 47, at 1364.
See id.
See id. at 1365.
See id. at 1368.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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under Section 271(b) by demonstrating that it had a good-faith belief
that the infringed patent was invalid.”323 Writing for the Majority,
Justice Kennedy stated that infringement and validity were separate
issues in a patent infringement context.324 Further, the majority
reasoned that since patents are presumed valid, a defense based on a
belief that a patent was valid would undermine that presumption.325
Kennedy concluded that accused infringers would find the good faith
belief in invalidity defense too easy to assert and referenced (1)
several other ways an accused infringer could show a patent was
invalid and (2) ways in which district courts could discourage
frivolous lawsuits.326 The implication here is that it is relatively easy
to find an attorney who, for a fee, would make plausible arguments
that any patent was invalid.
In opposition, Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts,
argued in favor of a good faith belief of invalidity as a defense to
inducement.327 Justice Scalia’s primary point was that the defense
should be allowed since it is impossible to infringe an invalid
patent.328 Further, in what was reportedly the Supreme Court’s first
mention of the word “patent troll,” the dissent argued that eliminating
good faith belief of invalidity as a defense to induced infringement
empowered patent trolls.329 Thus, for proponents of the good faith
belief of invalidity defense, the Court’s dissent provides some policy
rationale to renew the debate over § 271(b)’s scienter, judicially or
legislatively, as part of a larger battle to combat so-called patent trolls
and frivolous patent litigation.
Unfortunately, the debate between the majority and dissent in the
Commil decision fails to move the conversation about inducement
forward in any meaningful way. Instead of a closer examination of the
conduct of the accused inducer, the discussion is fixated on what the
accused inducer believed.330 Accordingly, the Commil opinion is yet
323.
See United States, supra note 124, at 6 ; see also Commil, supra note 19.
324.
See Commil, supra note 19.
325.
Id. at 1929.
326.
See id. at 1929, 1930-31(listing ways a defendant can obtain a ruling that a patent is
invalid; explaining that district courts have legal tools and the responsibility to dissuade
frivolous lawsuits).
327.
See id. at 1931.
328.
Id. (arguing that infringement cannot exist without a valid patent and a successful
assertion of the defense in question merely avoids liability—it does not invalidate the patent).
329.
Id.
330.
Id. (suggesting that if an accused inducer knew of a patent and knew that the patentee
believed the accused caused activities that infringed the patent then the accused inducer should
be liable for induced infringement).
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another example of the shift toward a conduct independent view of
inducement.
As illustrated above, a great deal of the debate about inducement
has focused solely on what an accused inducer must know and intend.
The next part argues for a recalibration of the induced infringement
analysis. Specifically, a close examination of the conduct of an
accused inducer should remain important in determining inducement
liability. Many of the challenges in this area can be addressed by
understanding the type of conduct the law of inducement is designed
to discourage. A greater awareness of inducing conduct may alleviate
the need to continue to complicate the scienter requirement for
induced infringement and lead to a clearer application of the law.
IV. RETHINKING INDUCED INFRINGEMENT
This part expands on the argument that the conduct of an
accused party should remain an important influence in induced
infringement analysis. Debates about the requisite knowledge and
intent required for liability dominate the induced infringement
discussion. Courts and commentators seem likely to continue to
debate and further complicate the current understanding of the
scienter requirement for inducement. However, induced patent
infringement cannot be completely understood and used effectively
without acknowledging the offending conduct of the accused party.
The following section outlines a practical framework for rethinking
induced patent infringement.
A. A Practical Framework for Change
This section posits that there are three primary reasons why
induced infringement and the issues explored in this article are
important. First, interactive patents, and the commercial embodiments
of those inventions, are becoming increasingly important as
interactive technology as the IoT becomes a reality. Further, there is a
need for legal clarity that will provide better guidance to district
courts and lead to clearer jury instructions. Finally, legal clarity will
enhance the ability of patentees and commercial participants’ to
forecast whether a patent is infringed. In turn, this may foster
competition in emerging technology areas.
1. The Internet and Interactive Technologies
The Internet has presented a unique set of challenges for the
patent system. The Internet created an environment where computer
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related methods flourished. It also created an environment where
those methods could be infringed by many different actors.331 In turn,
many patentees must rely on indirect infringement to enforce their
inventions since the direct infringers are judgment proof end users
and/or customers.332
Patentees in this area may be frustrated, however, because the
indirect infringement statutes seem to be ill-equipped to deal with
Internet Age inventions.333 Specifically, sections 271(b) and 271(c)
were written during a time where the focus of the courts and Congress
was on component-based inventions.334 The Internet did not exist in
1952. Further, method claims have evolved a great deal since 1952 to
include software and Internet related applications. For example,
software developers may be liable for inducement if they encourage
their customers to use their non-infringing software in a larger system
that infringes a patent.335
In addition, owners of interactive patents are more likely to rely
on an inducement theory to enforce their rights. For example, in the
biomedical context,
“[a] patent owner’s ability to prevent active inducement by
advertising and instruction or other activity is often critical to
obtaining effective protection for a patented invention consisting of a
new method of use of a known, staple product, such as a chemical
compound or composition, especially a new medical or therapeutic
use of a product that has an established alternative medical use.”336
Complicating the test for inducement or interpreting § 271(b) in
a way that makes it more difficult for a patentee to assert induced
infringement could have negative consequences on interactive
technologies. Specifically, weak patent protection in this area could
discourage investors from investing in start-ups and companies
developing interactive technology.337 Conversely, overly broad
protection for patents could have anti-competitive effects.
331.
See Rychlinski, supra note 59, at 225.
332.
Id.
333.
See Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation in Support of Defendant
at 1, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Nos.
2009-1372, 2009-1380, 2009-1416, 2009-1417), 2011 WL 3796789. (“Opening up third parties
to that unacceptable risk could have drastic effects on innovation and experimentation.”).
334.
See Rychlinski, supra note 59 (“The modern method patents of today were not
envisaged by the Aro Court, by the drafters of the 1952 Act, nor by the court confronting
infringing lamp and chimney manufacturers in Wallace.”).
335.
See Basinski, supra note 101, at 777.
336.
See CHISUM, supra note 16, at § 17.04 [4][f].
337.
See Rader, supra note 60.
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Accordingly, any interpretation of induced infringement must be
careful to strike a balance between these two economic concerns. In
striking that balance, it is also important that the law be as clear as
possible.
2. The Desire for Clear Legal Rules
The patent system includes a number of stakeholders, including
patentees, competing businesses, lawyers and the courts. A clear and
uniform understanding of the law regarding patent infringement
benefits each of these stakeholders in unique ways.338 In turn, the
patent system can achieve a proper balance between protecting
patentable inventions and promoting healthy competition.
Patentees have a strong interest in establishing clarity with
respect to induced infringement. A clear understanding of inducement
would give patentees a better idea of the scope of enforcement of the
patent.339 Will the patentee have to rely on inducement theory to
enforce their patent? If so, what evidence is sufficient to assert a
reasonably strong claim? What defenses will the accused infringer
assert? In addition, the answer to all these questions provides the
patentee with insight regarding the licensing value of its patents.340
In turn, corporations that may be potential licensees benefit from
a solid understanding of the scope of patented inventions that may be
susceptible to induced infringement. One commentator has argued
that due to the recent confusion regarding inducement, officers of
companies lack the clarity to direct their corporations in this area.341
This lack of clarity could discourage companies from investing in
new inventions they might not be able to protect or entering into a
market because they do not know how to avoid induced
infringement.342
If the law is not clear, it also makes it difficult for legal counsel
to advise a company as to how to avoid inducing infringement. To
accomplish this goal successfully, patent counsel have an interest in

338.
See id. at 327 (“[P]atent lawyers, inventors, and technology corporations . . . must be
able to base their research and development, and their patent decisions, on well-established
rules.”).
339.
See Kedem, supra note 226, at 1478.
340.
See id.
341.
See id. at 1467.
342.
See id.; See Rychlinski, supra note 59, at 216 (“A key tension in indirect
infringement cases-and cases of software in-direct infringement, in particular-is how best to
‘[confine] the protection of the law exclusively to the invention or discovery covered by the
patent grant.’”).
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understanding the legal effect of their opinions.343 Further, litigators
have an interest in knowing what defenses to patent infringement are
readily available to their client.
In addition to lawyers, the courts would benefit from a clearer
understanding of inducement. The Commil case is a recent example of
an instance where the district court’s understanding of the law led it to
provide the jury with incorrect jury instructions. There, the district
court instructed the jury that Cisco could be found liable for induced
infringement if Cisco “intended to cause the acts that constitute direct
infringement,” had knowledge of the patent and “knew or should have
known that its actions would induce actual infringement.”344 On
appeal, the Federal Circuit stated that the jury instruction was
incorrect. The Federal Circuit found fault with the part of the
instruction that allowed for liability if Cisco “should have known that
its actions would induce actual infringement.”345 In the court’s view,
the instructions were inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s decision
in Global-Tech.346 Instead, the Federal Circuit stated that induced
infringement required “knowledge that the induced acts constitute
patent infringement.”347
In sum, there is still a need for clarity with respect to the law of
induced infringement. An issue closely related to legal clarity is
briefly discussed below.
3. The Ability to Assess Risk
Forecasting refers to the ability of an entity or individual to
assess the risk of infringing a patent.348 Forecasting manifests itself,
for example, in opinions of counsel, indemnification agreements and
in decisions to file declaratory judgment actions. With respect to a
competitor’s patent, a company may seek an opinion of counsel that it
does not infringe or that the competitor’s patent is invalid before
entering into that commercial market.349 In some cases, a company
may file a declaratory judgment action to determine a patent’s scope
and validity in anticipation of entering into a market.350 Finally, in
343.
See Kedem, supra note 226, at 1478.
344.
See Commil, supra note 47, at 1365-66.
345.
Id.
346.
Id.
347.
Id.
348.
See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 411.
349.
See id. at 408 (describing seeking opinions of counsel as pro-competitive).
350.
See Kumar, supra note 29, at 743 (arguing that “expanding inducement liability to
include those who merely intend to induce the infringing acts would not chill competition
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various types of business dealings, it may be wise for an entity to seek
an indemnity agreement to protect itself from the expense that comes
with patent infringement lawsuits.
The lack of clarity regarding the requirements for inducement
liability and the defenses that are available to effectively negate a
claim for inducement negatively affect an entity’s forecasting ability.
For example, is an opinion of counsel sufficient evidence of a good
faith belief of non-infringement and invalidity?351 If so, how is this
good faith belief related to the intent required for inducement
liability?352
The answer to these questions depends on the intent standard that
is applied. For example, the belief of a defendant is irrelevant if the
intent required is “to cause the acts which constitute infringement.”353
In contrast, if the intent required is to specifically intend to induce
infringement of the patent, then what the defendant believes is
relevant.354 Consequently, if the defendant has forecasted correctly
that the patent is not infringed they will escape liability, however, if
the defendant has a good faith belief that the patent is invalid, that
belief alone will not be enough to escape liability.355
In brief, lack of clarity regarding the scienter requirement for
induced infringement diminishes parties’ ability to predict whether a
patent is likely infringed under an inducement theory. Tinkering
further with the intent prong may do more harm than good.356 Instead,
balancing questions about the intent of an accused party with an
inquiry into her conduct may provide an easier path to determining
what behavior the patent system should discourage versus what is
permissible.
B. Identifying Offending Conduct and Relationships
As set forth above, the debate surrounding inducement has been
dominated by a conversation about the intent required to impose

because potential market entrants can seek declaratory judgments to reduce the risk of
inducement liability”).
351.
See Miller, supra note 164, at 130.
352.
See Kedem, supra note 226, at 1492 (arguing that “although soliciting opinions from
counsel may serve as evidence of intent to avoid infringement, it cannot mask or counteract
evidence of actual knowledge of or intent to induce infringement”).
353.
See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 405.
354.
See id.
355.
See id. at 406; see also Commil, supra note 19.
356.
See Holbrook, supra note 4, at 399 (referring to “the important and uncertain role of
intent in assessing infringement” resulting from the existing case law).
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inducement liability. The extensive focus on intent by courts and
scholars has led to little consensus or confidence in any one
comprehensive solution or well established rule. This is problematic
for each stakeholder of the patent system because it hinders their
abilities to make business decisions and assess risk.357 Accordingly,
this section first calls for using the conduct of the accused inducer as
an important benchmark in an inducement determination, and then
suggests that another helpful insight concerning inducement liability
might exist in the relationship between the accused inducer and the
direct infringer.
1. The Conduct of the Accused Inducer
This subsection discusses the type of conduct other than basic
commercial activity that may lead to a finding of inducement liability.
Courts generally do not characterize basic commercial activity by
itself as conduct that would lead to inducement liability under §271
(b). This type of commercial conduct includes activities such as
ordering or purchasing an infringing product and selling or marketing
a staple component.358 However, a workable inducement standard
cannot ignore conduct that decreases incentives for inventors to apply
for and enforce their patents.359
First, providing instructions to a third party that assists or
encourages that third party to directly infringe a patent has been
characterized as a physical element of inducement.360 The Supreme
Court has endorsed the act of instructing another party on how to
infringe as a “paradigm for infringing inducement.”361 An accused
inducer can be shown to have provided such instructions in various
ways, including methods such as advertising or through product
labels.362 Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Cardinal Industries,
Inc. is an example of a case where an accused inducer’s advertising
provided instructions on how to infringe a patent.363 Specifically, the
defendant sold a concrete saw and advertised that the saw could be
used by the buyer in a way that would infringe a method claim that
covered a process for cutting concrete at a specific time during the

357.
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.

See Rader, supra note 60, at 327.
See CHISUM, supra note 16, at § 17.04 [4][e]-[f].
See Lemley, supra note 4, at 232.
See Rantanen, supra note 28, at 1598.
See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005).
See CHISUM, supra note 16, at § 17.04 [4][f].
See id.
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hardening of the concrete.364
Second, designing an infringing apparatus or system has also
been characterized as inducement.365 Presumably, the direct infringer
uses the design to infringe the asserted patent. Case law seems to
indicate that the accused inducer does not have to create the entire
infringing design. For example, in Baut v. Pethick Construction Co.
three parties (an architect, a general contractor, and a subcontractor)
contributed to the design of a stain glass window that infringed the
plaintiff’s patent.366
Finally, a broad range of activities such as encouraging,
advocating, suggesting or assisting a direct infringer to infringe a
patent have been held as conduct sufficient to impose inducement
liability under § 271(b). Even before the Patent Act of 1952, these
types of activities have historically been associated with
inducement.367 These activities commonly accompany other noninfringing activities of the accused inducer such as selling a
component with non-infringing uses.368 A representative example of
these activities include “[l]easing machinery which is to be used in
illegally practicing a patent, furnishing expert advice on the
construction of infringing machinery, and ordering from one
manufacturer goods which can be produced only by the patented
process of a third party.”369
In sum, a large amount of affirmative acts can cause
inducement.370 This paper acknowledges that in some cases it is
difficult to ascertain whether particular conduct is relevant under §
271(b).371 However, understanding the requisite intent is no less
daunting. For example, in many cases it will be difficult to assess the
intent of a corporation.372
The discussion above suggests that there are at least three
364.
See id.
365.
See id. at § 17.04 [4][d].
366.
Baut v. Pethick Constr. Co., 262 F.Supp. 350 (M.D. Pa. 1966).
367.
See Frischling et al., supra note 168, at 276; Basinski, supra note 101, at 778.
368.
See Frischling et al., supra note 168, at 276.
369.
Confusion Codified, supra note 155, at 139.
370.
See CHISUM, supra note 16, at § 17.04 [4] (“In Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Co.,
Ltd. (2001), the Federal Circuit noted that liability under Section 271(b) requires some type of
affirmative action inducing infringement. In Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A. (2011),
the Supreme Court noted that the adverb ‘actively’ in Section 271(b) suggested, in view of its
dictionary definition, that ‘the inducement must involve the taking of affirmative steps to bring
about the desired result.’”).
371.
Confusion Codified, supra note 155, at 140.
372.
See Rantanen, supra note 28, at 1610.
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categories of conduct that may explain a finding of inducement under
§271(b). Rather than focusing solely on questions about the intent of
the accused inducer, a closer examination of whether the conduct of
the accused infringer is offensive in nature in conjunction with some
intent inquiry could lead to a clearer understanding of inducement
liability.
2. The Accused Inducer and Direct Infringer
In addition to focusing on conduct, in some instances the
relationship between the accused inducer and direct infringer may be
helpful in determining whether there should be a finding of induced
infringement. In joint or divided infringement cases—a doctrine
closely related to inducement—one of the key inquiries concerns the
relationship between the alleged infringing parties: specifically,
whether one party directed or controlled the actions of the other
party.373 A similar inquiry into the relationship between the parties in
an inducement context could also be helpful in inducement
determinations.
The relationship between an accused infringer and a direct
infringer is an indication of how entangled the parties are. Professor
Rantenen’s objective fault formulation states that the closer and
stronger the relationship between the parties, the higher the risk that
the requisite intent for inducement exists.374 There is some case law to
support this idea. In Tegal Corp. v. Tokyo Electron Co., Ltd. (2001),
for example, no evidence was presented that the defendant directed or
controlled the direct infringer or its management.375 The court found
that the defendant did not induce another to infringe.376 Accordingly,
there seems to be a foundation for closer examination of the
relationship between the parties.
However, this article stops short of recommending that an
inquiry into the relationship between the accused inducer and direct
infringer should be determinative of induced infringement. Too much
emphasis on relationships would frustrate common commercial
arrangements such as a buyer/seller or customer/provider relationship.
In these types of relationships, indemnity agreements for patent

373.
overruled
2012).
374.
375.
376.

See BMC Res., Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2007),
by Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir.
See Rantanen, supra note 28, at 1622-1623.
See CHISUM, supra note 16, at § 17.04 [4].
See id.
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infringement liability are commonplace. The law does not view these
types of standard indemnity agreements as establishing active
inducement.377 For example, in Hewlett-Packard Co. the Federal
Circuit held that the accused inducer’s agreement to indemnify the
buyer for patent infringement did not amount to inducement.378 For
these reasons, this article suggests only that the type of relationship
between the parties provides a useful context for further examination
of the conduct and intent of an accused party.
In sum, thinking about what types of relationships commonly
coincide with inducement can be useful. However, evidence of a
relationship between two parties is not determinative. Accordingly, it
is best to think about the type of relationship that exists between an
accused inducer and the direct infringer as a useful clue in an
inducement liability determination. Considering conduct in
conjunction with the relationship between the parties may provide a
simpler way to think about inducement liability in view of the
challenges posed by interactive patents, the need for clearer legal
rules and the pressure on parties to forecast patent infringement.
3. A Path Forward
Recent discussions about how the inducement statute should be
interpreted have largely focused on the question of intent.379 This
narrow focus has not led to greater legal clarity. In response, this
paper calls for a shift in the discussion. Specifically, a greater
understanding of the conduct that subjects an accused infringer to
inducement liability would provide more clarity in inducement
determinations. The contributory infringement statute is substantially
easier to understand and apply because the infringing conduct is
included in the language of the statute.380 Although section 271(b) is
intentionally broader, years of common law before and after the 1952
Patent Act do provide some indication of the type of inducing conduct
that patent law should discourage.381
Given the discussion about conduct and the relationship between
the accused inducer and the direct infringer above, it may be possible
to reach the correct outcome in many inducement cases without
fixating on the type of intent the accused inducer must have. Further,
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.

See id. at § 17.04 [4][b].
See CHISUM, supra note 16, at § 17.04 [4].
See supra Part III.
See 35 U.S.C. § 271(c).
See supra part III.
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refocusing the inducement inquiry on conduct may help solve some of
the challenges posed by patents that are likely to be enforced under §
271(b).
For example, interactive inventions are the type of inventions
that rely more heavily on induced infringement for enforcement.382 A
more balanced inquiry that includes a close consideration of the
accused inducer’s conduct may provide patentees with a more
reasonable path to enforcement.
By their nature, Internet inventions will involve interaction
between more than one party. The inducement analysis should not
solely focus on what each party intended; instead, it should also
consider the conduct of the parties involved. Did one party provide
the other with instructions that resulted in infringement? Was there
evidence of encouragement or assistance that led to infringement?
Further, what type of relationship did the parties have? Was it an
arm’s-length transaction or was one party directing or controlling the
actions of another? All of these considerations should be taken into
account in addition to questions about the intent of the accused
infringer.
Further, in some instances, it may be easier to identify and
understand evidence related to the conduct of the accused infringer
than what the accused infringer intended. If there is a better
understanding of the types of conduct that are associated with
inducement liability, patentees can provide better evidence,
defendants can rebut arguments without always having to rely on
opinions of counsel, and courts can provide clearer jury instructions.
Certain relationships may be viewed as strong signals of inducement.
Professor Lemley’s sliding scale formulation aligns with this
sentiment because it calls for a lesser showing of intent the more the
accused inducer is entangled with the defendant.383
Finally, the forecasting problem appears easier to solve when
one carefully considers the offensive conduct of the parties. For
example, a party seeking to avoid induced infringement liability
should not engage in activities such as providing instructions,
encouraging or assisting in actions that can lead to direct
infringement. Identifying relationships that are likely to indicate
inducement liability could also be helpful to companies in crafting
indemnification agreements.384 In sum, legal clarity benefits
382.
383.
384.
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stakeholders in these emerging technologies by making it easier to
assess infringement risk and make better business decisions.
CONCLUSION
Much of the debate regarding induced infringement focuses on
the type of intent an accused party must possess. While important,
this conversation continues to inject complexity into induced
infringement analysis. Further, the overemphasis on the intent
requirement has led to less conversation about the type of conduct
that induces infringement. In response, this article proposes that the
law rebalance the induced infringement inquiry by closely
considering (1) the conduct of the accused party and (2) the
relationship between the accused inducer and the direct infringer as a
factor in determining infringement liability.
Recognizing conduct and the relationships between the parties as
an important influence in induced infringement analysis may help
solve several challenges. Specifically, determining what conduct the
patent system wants to discourage could provide more legal clarity.
That clarity will assist patentees and market participants in better
understanding the risk of liability with respect to induced
infringement. Finally, a better understanding of induced infringement
will also benefit innovators in emerging technology areas that
commonly rely on induced infringement as a way of enforcing their
patents.

99 (2011).

